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Abstract 
This paper examines the trend in absentee voting over the last thirty years in Cali­
fornia. With the liberalization of absentee voting laws and practices, an increase in the 
numbers of absentee voters quickly followed. Absentee voters have already demonstrated 
their ability to influence the outcomes of local elections. An open question is what will 
become of absentee voters in the future. If they are the model for "voting at home," and 
if technological advances allow such, then the behavior of current absentee voters may 
be indicative of the future electorate. 
The increasing trend of voters opting for absentee ballots is analyzed by using GLS on 
a random effects time-series cross-section model with county level data. The focus is on 
identifying structural factors such as changing voter demographics that have influenced 
the decision of voters to cast absentee ballots. Thirty-three recent state-wide elections 
in California are the basis for this analysis, covering the statewide primary and general 
elections from November 1962, through November 1994. 
We find that the impact of demographics and time trends on absentee voting differ 
between general and primary elections. In addition, we find that a 1977 liberalization 
law in California had the effect of accelerating the usage of the absentee format. Finally, 
we conclude that absentee and precinct voting are substitutes in general elections but 
complements in primary elections. 
Keywords:. abs.entee_yo.ting, .nes.ted.logit,,panel .data,. political. participation, aggregate 
nested logit, random effects 
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COMPARING ABSENTEE AND PRECINCT VOTERS: 
A VIEW OVER TIME* 
Jeffrey A. Dubin Gretchen A. Kalsow 
1 Introduction 
After narrowly losing to Diane Feinstein in the most expensive U.S. Senate campaign in 
history, Michael Huffington accused his opponent of benefiting from fraud in voter regis­
tration and absentee voting. Between the early 1970s and the early 1990s the percentage 
of ballots cast through the absentee process increased from three to four percent to over 
twenty percent. Refer to Figure 1. There are several accounts in the past decade of ab­
sentee voters being the decisive group-George Deukmejian beating Tom Bradley, Dan 
Lungren defeating Arlo Smith, and Diane Feinstein defeating a recall attempt when she 
was the mayor of San Francisco (Cook (1991) , Dresslar (1990) , Patterson and Caldeira 
(1985) , Quinn (1983) , and Willis (1994)). 1 While these outcomes may be isolated in­
stances of the impact of absentee voters, their rapid increase in numbers raises questions 
regarding who are the absentee voters and is their voting behavior different from that of 
precinct voters. In addition to being critical to the election outcome, absentees may also 
be the model for the future. The information age may usher in voting at home through 
the telephone, home computer, or even a cable station2 
A potential cause of the change in absentee voting in California is a 1977 law that 
eliminated the medical, disability, and work related requirements for requesting absentee 
ballots. Stemmler (1983) states that the legislation simply legalized the liberalization that 
had already occurred in practice. However, the liberalization of absentee voting laws has 
not been without challenges. The principal allegations stem from privacy issues, the use 
of third parties to handle absentee ballots, the potential for misuse and voter fraud. 
*The helpful comments of R. Michael Alvarez, Richard Braunstein, Ted Jelen, Jonathan Katz, D.
Roderick Kiewiet, and Santa Traugott are gratefully acknowledged. Earlier versions of this paper were 
presented at the Western Political Science Association Annual Conference, Portland, Oregon, March 17, 
1995, and at the Midwest Political Science Association Annual Conference, Chicago, IL, April 6, 1995. 
1 Patterson and Caldeira note that absentees are "decisive only in the trivial sense that officials counted 
them last." (1985, p. 785) 
2Cook quotes former Governor Jerry Brown stating his support for computer and telephone voting. 
With few exceptions prior studies of voter behavior have either ignored absentees or 
stumbled upon absentees by accident, little is known about absentee voters. For exam­
ple, Mueller (1969) analyzed voter fatigue and drop-off using a sample of ballots that 
contained a majority of absentee ballots. Perhaps unaware that absentee voting patterns 
differ from precinct voters, he offers conclusions on voter fatigue. However, in recent 
California elections we know that absentee voters in Los Angeles county vote on ap­
proximately five percent fewer propositions than do their precinct voting counterparts. 
One significant exception is a study by Patterson and Caldeira (1985) that examines 
the absentee voting rates in California and Iowa. Their primary focus is ·an the 1982 
gubernatorial races in which the winners George Deukmejian and Terry Branstad both 
garnered larger shares of the absentee vote than they did of the precinct vote. Patter­
son and Caldeira report on the relationship between absentee rates and age, mcome, 
partisanship, turnout, and urbanization. 
In general, what we do know about absentee voters seems to be the result of a few 
close elections where absentee voters were pivotal. For example, absentees "gave" the 
governorship to Deukmejian in 1982, the attorney general position to Lungren in 1990, 
and kept Feinstein as the mayor of San Francisco in a 1983 recall election. In addition, 
there are several local election outcomes that are attributed to the number of the absentee 
voters (see Stemmler (1983) and Walrath-Riley (1984)) .  At the extreme of absentee 
voting are mail elections. Hamilton (1988) and Magleby (1987) study elections that were 
held entirely through the mail. Hamilton provides a cost comparison of all-mail elections 
and precinct voting elections, finding that mail elections offer local governments the 
opportunity to save substantial amounts of money. Magleby found higher than "normal" 
participation for municipal elections and he determined that education was an important 
factor that increased participation. 
This paper examines the absentee voting process and its growth over time in Cal­
ifornia. Our goal is to answer three questions regarding absentee voters. First, is it 
appropriate to model an individual voter's behavior as consisting of two steps, where the 
first decision is whether to cast an absentee ballot or not , and the subsequent decision is 
whether or not to vote at the precinct, given that the voter did not obtain an absentee 
ballot? A second interesting question is whether the legislature, as a political actor, was 
able to effect a change in voting behavior through the passage of a law liberalizing access 
to absentee ballots. Finally, we consider the opportunlty cost of time model for absentee 
voting behavior. If it is correct then factors such as the presence of children and access 
to the polling location will influence a voter's decision to vote absentee. 
An individual's decision to vote at the precinct or to vote absentee is the basis for the 
model. The decision process is depicted in Figure 2a. We assume that voters first decide 
whether or not to request an absentee ballot, and if not, on election day they decide 
whether or not to vote at a precinct polling location. Therefore, the passage of time is 
reflected by a left to right movement in the figure. 3 
3 An alternate choice model is to assume that the voter first decides whether or not to vote, and if 
so, to vote absentee or at a polling location .. This alternative appears less feasible since the decision to 
2 
[Figures 2a and 2b Here] 
While our goal is to assess the impact of the change in absentee laws that took effect 
in 1978 and the passage of time, we also consider changing demographics and the type 
of election. Since the effects of each factor are separated, the independent effect of time 
and the law change can be analyzed. 
The next section of this paper briefly describes the history of absentee voting in Cal­
ifornia and the current process for casting an absentee ballot. Section 3 of this paper 
outlines the econometric approach used for the time-series cross section analysis of our 
absentee voting model. Section 4 discusses the data sources and independent variables 
employed. Section 5 describes the hypotheses regarding absentee voting that will be 
tested with the model. Section 6 highlights the results of our analysis. The last sec­
tion discusses the results, their implications on future policy, and directions for further 
research. 
2 Absentee Voting in California 
Absentee voting, in the form of proxy voting by colonial farmers, has been used in the 
United States since the 17th century. In California the first attempts to allow for absentee 
voting occurred during the Civil War. 4 Although they were found to be unconstitutional, 
those acts "would have allowed Union soldiers to vote away from home" (Cook 1991, 
p. 102). During World War I several more attempts were made to pass an amendment
allowing citizens to vote absentee if they were more than ten miles away from home. The 
voters rejected three attempts between 1914 and 1920. Finally, in 1922 an amendment 
to allow. absentee voting was approved by a narrow margin. 5 
The initial absentee voting law was intended to allow servicemen away from home 
the right to vote. However, over time absentee voting has been expanded to cover the 
disabled and elderly. By the 1960's the right to vote absentee was granted to those living 
in sparsely populated areas as a cost saving measure for the state (Patterson and Caldeira 
(1985) , and Walrath-Riley (1984)) .  Election reform committees in the 1970's suggested 
several changes. However, none of the bills passed until 1977 when a bill introduced by 
Assemblyman Richard Lehman of Fresno was approved. It eliminated the requirements 
for voting absentee and allowed all voters access to absentee ballots. A further change 
came in 1982 when a bill was passed creating a permanent absentee list. It's purpose was 
request an absentee ballot must occur at least seven days prior to the election, i.e., casting an absentee 
ballot is not an election-day event. Figure 2b depicts this alternate model. 
4Patterson and Caldeira (1985) report that 2.7 percent of the ballots cast in 1864 were absentees. 
5Refer to Patterson and Caldeira (1985) for additional information on other states and the passage of 
absentee laws during the same time period. Patterson and Caldeira also report on several early studies 
of absentee voting that occurred in the 1920's and 1930's. 
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to provide a mechanism for elderly and disabled voters to consistently receive absentee 
ballots, without requiring them to make a new request every election. 
The current process in California allows a voter to request an absentee ballot from 
seven to 29 days prior to the election (there are exception conditions which allow a voter 
to request an absentee ballot within the seven-day period). 6  The ballots are sent to the 
individuals starting 29 days before the election. The voter is responsible for ensuring 
that the completed ballot is delivered to the appropriate location by the end of election 
day either through the mail or in person. In addition, third parties may also pick up a 
ballot and return it to election officials. 
Although absentee voting may have increased participation among specific groups 
of voters, it is not without its problems. The problems range from processing volumes 
and privacy issues to allegations of fraud. 7 For example, Walrath-Riley (1984) describes 
the processing problems associated with the large, unanticipated numbers of absentee 
ballots in a local Santa Monica election. The inability of election officials to process the 
number of absentee ballot requests lead to many voters receiving their ballots too late 
to meet the election deadline. A court order mandated that the late ballots be accepted, 
but that their vote totals be kept separate. If a city council race was close, then these 
late absentee ballots were to be counted. Walrath-Riley (1984), Hamilton (1988), and 
Stemmler (1983) outline the privacy issues r�lated to several court cases in the early 1980's 
regarding absentee voting, specifically dealing with third parties. Walrath-Riley also cites 
lack of voter understanding as a problem with absentee voting. Once a voter submits an 
application to vote absentee they are not eligible to vote at the precinct polling location. 
However, some voters are unaware of what they are signing and accidentally toss the 
ballot when it arrives in the mail. Donovan (1989) also describes absentee processing as 
an expensive, labor-intensive procedure during which signatures are verified and votes 
counted. 
Other concerns associated with absentee voting are related to the media and the 
campaigns, such as the desire to accurately predict the outcome on a timely basis and 
the duration of the last campaign push. For example, predicting elections based on polls 
taken at polling locations may not be accurate (Quinn ( 1983) and Willis ( 1994)). It 
may also be several days, in fact up to 28 days in California, before official election 
returns are available. 8 An increase in absentee ballots increases the time between the 
semi-official returns issued the night of election (or morning after) and the official returns. 
Candidates and proposition supporters must also contend with a month-long "get out to 
vote" campaign and expenditure cycle rather than a single day. 
6For exa.mple,-.-a medical .ore family emergency.· can be .a valid,reason for requesting an absentee ballot 
withing the seven days prior to an election. 
7Refer to Passell (1994) for an overview of a voter fraud allegation in Pennsylvania's Second State 
Senatorial District in Philadelphia. The difference in Democratic and Republican vote counts in absentee 
ballots and precinct ballots is compared to that for prior elections. This election does not appear to 
produce results that are similar to typical elections. 
8Donovan considers this delay to be a "frustratingly long time in close elections (1989, p. 2896)." 
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3 A Model of Absentee Voting 
Our empirical analysis generates estimates of the effects of demographics and trends over 
time on absentee voting. The economic models and econometric techniques used to esti­
mate these effects in the absentee voting model are defined below. Since the data consists 
of frequencies with large numbers of observations per group, McFadden (1981) suggests 
that such information can be viewed as though it was produced by a representative voter 
repeatedly making a choice. Although the decisions are discrete, what is observed is the 
percentage of times a particular choice is made, which is continuous. 
Before formalizing our absentee voting model found in Figure 2a, let us briefly ex­
plain our notation. Let i = 1, . . .  , 57, represent counties in California. 9 Let t = 
62, 64, 66, . . .  , 94, represent the election years. 10 Let j = 0, 1, represent the first deci­
sion, where 1 is voting absentee and 0 is not voting absentee. The probability of voting 
absentee is P j=l and the probability of not voting absentee is P j=O. Finally, let k = 0, 1
represent the second decision, with 1 indicating voting at the precinct polling location, 
and 0 representing not voting in the election. Therefore, the probability of voting at the 
precinct polling location is P k=ljj=o, and the probability of not voting is P k=Oli=O· 
3.1 A Nested Logit Model of the Absentee Decision 
We use a nested logit model to represent the choice hierarchy given in Figure 2a. 11 The 
conditional probability of voting given the decision to not vote as an absentee is given 
by: 
eVipk=llj=O = Vt V (1) e o + e 1
where Vi is the utility of the kth alternative. In our empirical setting we set Vi = X /3k 
where X is a vector of explanatory variables affecting the decision to vote and /3k are the 
unobserved weights attached to these variables. As a normalization, we set (30 = 0. 
The probability of voting absentee in the first stage depends upon the expected maxi­
mum utility derived in the second stage in the nested logit model. The expected maximum 
utility from the decision to vote at the precinct or not vote is given by the inclusive-value: 
incv = log(ev0 + eVi). 
The probability of casting an absentee ballot is given by 
eZ1
P·..:...1 = . . J- eZ1 + eZo+Bmcv 
(2) 
(3) 
9 Although California has 58 counties, Alpine county is excluded from the dataset since its size prevents 
the Bureau of the Census from publishing selected demographics due to privacy issues. 
10The general elections analyzed in this paper occur in 1962 through 1994. The set of primary elections 
we analyze are from 1964 through 1994. 
11See McFadden (1981) for the derivation of nested logit models, and Bechtel (1990) and Dubin, et 
al. (1992) for details on the estimation of'nested logit models using aggregate data. 
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where Zj is the strict utility associated with alternatives in the first stage. In our empirical 
application of the nested logit model, we set Zj = W /j where vV is a vector of explanatory 
factors affecting the strict utility for the absentee/precinct decision and /j are the weights 
attached to these factors. As a normalization we set /o = 0. 
As is standard for the nested logit model, estimation proceeds sequentially. First we 
determine the expected maximum utility, incv, using equation (2).12 Note that as
we have 
1 
----- = 1 + eV1 
1 -pk=llj=O 
so that incv = log(l + ev1 )  = -log(l-Pk=llj=o) .
We replace Pk=llj=O by the actual frequency of precinct voting given the non-absentee 
choice to achieve a consistent estimate of incv. Once the expected maximum utility for 
the second stage has been calculated we proceed to estimate the absentee/precinct model 
given in equation (3). In our formulation of the nested choice model the conditional choice 
probability model for P k=lli=O is not specifically estimated even though the data would 
permit this estimation if it were of independent interest. 
3.2 Estimation of the Nested Logit Model 
The estimation of equation (3) requires special treatment for the aggregate time-series 
cross-sectional nature of the underlying data. We can re-write equation (3) in log-odds 
form as: 
Z1 -[Zo + Oincv] 
W11 - Oincv. (4) 
Using an estimate of the left-hand side of equation ( 4) which depends on the cross­
sectional time-series measurement of the log-odds probability of absentee/precinct prob­
abilities implies 
1 ( Flit ) TXT • � og A = vv it/1 + pzncVit + tit1 -plit 
where p = - 0 and tit = log(P1it/(1 -Flit)) -log(P1it/(1 -Flit)).
(5) 
The variance of tit is not constant but depends on the underlying probabilities, Plit , 
and the number of ballots cast in county i and election t ,  Nit· It can be shown that 
12Note that the coefficient of the inclusive-value in equation (3) is anticipated to be in the unit interval. 
Refer to McFadden (1981) for additional information. 
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Var( cit) = 1/(Nitl\t(l -Pit)) (see Maddala, 1983). To compensate for the heteroscedas­
ticity introduced by the variation in the number of observations per county per election 
and the differentials in absentee voting rates, we use the weight Wit = NitPlit(l -Plit)· 
The weighted model: 
[ ( 
Flit 
)] [ ( 
Pw )] 
Wit log 
(l _ Flit) 
-Wit log (l _ Pw) 
= WitEit = Eit· (6) 
has Var( Eit) = Var( WitEit) = a constant. 
While the weighted model has constant variance, it is not reasonable to expect that 
observations across time for a specific county are independent. Since our data consists of 
electoral information by county across thirty years, a dependence in the error structure 
across time which is specific to the individual county may exist. To account for this 
possible error structure we assume a random effects decomposition for Eit· Under this 
assumption Eit = O'.i + 'T/it where E(ai) = E('T/it) = O, Var(ai) = a;, Var('T/it) = a;, 
Cov(ai, aj) = 0, i -=/- j, Cov('T/it , 'T/js) = 0, i -=/- j and Cov('T/it, 'T/js) = O, i -=/- j and 
t -=/- s. 7lit are therefore i.i.d. over time and O'.i are i.i.d. over counties. However, the 
serial dependence Cov( Eit , Eis) -=/- 0 arises due to the presence of the common random 
component O'.i. 
The generalized least squares estimates for the model in equation ( 5) can be achieved 
by subtracting a fraction, 8, of the time averaged data by county from each observation 
( Eit -Oci.) where 
8 - 1 - ( 
a; 
) 
t
(7) - (a�+ Ta;) 
This fraction is a function of the error variances of between- and within- group estimators, 
with adjustments made for degrees of freedom. 13 Given the estimates of a; and a; we 
can determine the weight 8 needed for GLS estimation as well as the proportion of the 
variance of Eit that is due to the county specific effect O'.i. If the proportion is large, then 
most of the unobservable variance is specific to the county effect. The proportion of total 
variance from the county specific component is: 
1 -(2 
1 + (T -1)(2 
where ( = 1 -8. 
4 Data Sources and Independent Variables 
(8) 
We employ two primary data sources in our analysis, the Statement of Vote (SOV) 
published by the California Secretary of State's office, and the County and City Databook 
13See Maddala (1971) for further information on the GLS time-series cross-section estimation proce­
dure. Note that 8 should lie in the unit interval. 
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published by the Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. The SOV, available 
after the official vote count is completed, contains county level information on the number 
of eligible voters, registered voters, and results by candidate for state and national offices. 
Our analysis covers the statewide primary and general elections from November 1962 
through November 1994, using information from a total of thirty-three elections. 1 4 For 
these elections the SOY also includes the number of ballots cast at precinct polling places 
and those cast by absentees. 15 Our analysis of general elections employs 17 elections, with 
57 counties represented in each election, for a total of 969 observations. The primary 
election analysis is based on 16 elections (June 1964 through June 1994) with· 57 counties, 
minus four counties not reporting absentees for 1976, and minus one county in 1986 that 
failed to report Republican registration, for a total of 907 observations. 
In addition to the data for the dependent variables (percent voting absentee), the SOV 
also provides the data for an independent variable. The percentage of registered voters 
that register as Republicans is included in our analysis as a measure of party affiliation. 
While the percentage of registered voters that are Republican tends to be correlated 
with demographic factors, that correlation is not perfect. A· regression of the log odds 
of Republican registration on the demographic, geographic, and time trend variables 
accounts for only 46 percent of the variance. Therefore, the Republican registration 
percentage may reflect partisanship leanings beyond those indicated by the other factors 
alone. 16 
The County and City Databook contains county level decennial census information. 
Data from the 1960, 1970, 1980, and 1990 Census of Population and Housing were inter­
polated for the intervening elections. A constant growth rate calculated from 1980 to 1990 
was used to extrapolate the 1990 census data for 1991 through 1994. The independent 
variables obtained from the historical census data include all the demographic variables 
identified in Table 1. The descriptive statistics for the demographic, party affiliation, 
and turnout variables are given for each decennial census year in Table 2. 
[Tables 1 and 2 Here] 
One note should be made regarding the racial arid ethnic background of voters in 
California. Although it is preferable to include other racial and ethnic groups, such as 
14There were three special statewide elections during this period (November 1973, November 1979,
and November 1993) that are omitted from our analysis. 
. 
15There were two exceptions in the time period. In November 1974 and June 1976 the total number 
of absentee ballots cast by county was not tabulated in the SOV. However, the number of absentees per 
candidate per county was available for the U.S. Senate contest in both of those elections. Therefore, the 
proportion of absentee ballots in each of those contests is used in place of the proportion of total ballots 
that were absentee. 
16Note that since the Republican registration percentage is a function of income and education, the 
partial derivatives of voting propensity with respect to such factors do not result in "natural" experi­
ments. For example, it would not be reasonable to assume that an increase in real median family income 
would occur without a corresponding increase in Republican registration. 
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Latino-Americans and Asian-Americans, in our analysis, the data is not available for the 
entire time series. Information beyond the percentage of African-Americans and "foreign 
stock" is not available for 1960 and 1970. The availability of the data does however 
match the increase in the numbers and visibility of diverse racial and ethnic groups. 1 7  
The remaining independent variables are related to the geographic location of a 
county, the context or ballot attractiveness of the election, the time of the election. 
The two areas of California we isolated are the San Francisco Bay Area (counties which 
border the bay plus Santa Cruz) and Southern California (counties south of Santa Bar­
bara, Ventura, Los Angeles, and Riverside) . The elections are also divided into midterm 
and presidential elections. Our analysis of the effect of time on the increase of absentee 
voting is broken down into three terms: a dummy variable indicating elections occurring 
after 1979, a trend term measuring the number of years since 1961, and another trend 
term for the period after 1979. 
5 Hypotheses 
The first set of independent variables listed in Table 1 include the demographic char­
acteristics of the county. If conservative Republican coalitions are the dominant force 
behind getting out the absentee vote, as Cook (1991) and Willis (1994) suggest, then 
specific segments of the population fitting the stereotypical profile of a conservative have 
probably been courted more often and more intensely for absentee voting. Conversely, 
those outside the mold have probably received fewer direct mail requests for absentee 
voting and, hence, have felt less of a push to vote absentee. This may include the non­
white segment of the population, which leads us to hypothesize a negative relationship 
between African-American populations and absentee voting. 
Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980) found education to be the most important factor 
in determining participation. Dubin and Kalsow (1994) separated political participa­
tion into three events, registration, turnout, and ballot completion, and also found that 
education is a significant, positive influence in all three events. The question then be­
comes, if more educated people are more likely to turnout, given that they've registered, 
which method of voting will they use? Will they vote absentee more or less often than 
others? An analysis of Republican registration over the same time period demonstrates 
a negative relationship with median education. Since Republicans have been the most 
successful group in getting out the absentee vote we anticipate a negative relationship 
between absentee voting and education. 
If the decision to cast a ballot through the absentee process rather than at the polling 
location is the result of " . . .  an on-the-go society of always-busy, two-worker families," 
as Cook suggests (1991, p. 101), then people with fewer time demands may vote at the 
polling place more frequently. Cook and Quinn (1983) both tell stories of absentee voters 
17 A future research project will use census tract level electoral data matched with the race and ethnicity 
information available since 1980. 
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that are consistent with theories that place an opportunity cost on time and anticipate 
that voters minimize their costs of voting. If the cost of going to the precinct polling 
location on election day is recognized to be too high prior to that day, then the voter may 
chose to obtain an absentee ballot. On the other hand, those with less crowded schedules 
may anticipate that they will not feel as much time pressure on election day. This implies 
that the unemployment rate should be negatively correlated with absentee voting, and 
that the presence of young children will be positively related to absentee voting. 
The absentee process is also thought to be used by higher income, older, more con­
servative voters (see Cook (1991) , Oliver (1995) , and Willis (1994)) .  If that is true, then 
income, percent over age 64, and Republican party affiliation should be positively corre­
lated with absentee voting. 1 8 In addition, anecdotal evidence regarding election results 
for Dan Lungren in 1990 and George Deukmejian in 1982, among others, indicates that 
absentee voting and Republican registration should be positively correlated. 
Homeownership is a proxy for Teixeira's (1992) social connectedness, and as such 
may signal the level of commitment to one's community. As a result, we would expect 
homeowners to register and vote more often. The question is open as. to whether they 
will utilize absentee ballots more or less frequently than renters. 
There are two types of absentee voters, which are indistinguishable in our data; the 
first type is the "voluntary" absentee voter, and the second is the voter who lives in 
a sparsely populated area. As a cost control measure the voters in some rural areas 
are required to vote absentee-precinct polling locations are cost prohibitive. 1 9  Of the 
voluntary absentee voters there are those that are either out-of-town or too busy to vote 
on election day, and those who live some distance from polling locations. In order to 
save time or for convenience, voters in more rural areas may make use of the absentee 
ballot more often. We include a percent urban variable in our analysis to control for the 
presence of involuntary absentee voting. 2 0 
The geographic location of counties in California may be important for two reasons. 
The first is that they may represent pockets of established minority groups, i.e. , those 
who are eligible to vote and have ready access to media and public resources in their 
native language. The Bay Area and Southern California may also represent the major 
media markets for the state. 21 As such advertisers may be able to increase their reach 
18Refer to Patterson and Caldeira for a similar set of socioecon�mic variables. They analyze the effects 
of the percentage over 64 and the percent Democrat on the absentee voting rate. Note that Patterson 
and Caldeira report that the Republican advantage drops in half between 1978 and 1982. 
19Hamilton (1988) compares the costs of several all-mail ballot elections, finding that mail balloting 
results in signifrcant-·savings ·over precinct ·voting; The savings Hamilton reports range from 17 percent 
to 75 percent of the cost of a precinct-voting election. 
20See also Patterson and Caldeira (1985), who use percent urban, and Oliver (1995), who uses percent 
suburban and percent rural, as examples of other studies that consider the impact of local electoral 
conditions. In addition, in California the local registrar is allowed to determine whether or not a polling 
location will be provided (Patterson and Caldeira (1985)). 
21The population in the Bay Area ranges from 20.5 percent of the current population of California, 
to a high of 23.8 percent of the population in the early 1960s. The southern California counties account 
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and a specified saturation level at a lower cost. Hence, it may be more effective for a 
get-out-to-vote campaign to target the Bay Area or the southern part of the state.22 The 
relative cost per additional vote will be significantly lower than that for other areas of 
the state. Both of these reasons lead to an expectation of increased absentee voting in 
the Bay Area and southern California. 
In addition, we analyze the effect of midterm versus presidential elections on absentee 
voting. Since political participation levels, measured as either registration or turnout 
rates, is typically higher in presidential elections than midterm elections, it may be 
reasonable to assume that absentee rates will also be higher for presidential elections. If 
the level of absentee voting is correlated with the attractiveness of the ballot, and if the 
presidential ballot is assumed to be more attractive than voting for the governor, then 
absentee rates should be higher for presidential years. 
Additionally, we want to analyze the effect of time on the increase in absentee voting. 
First we look for a shift in the level of absentee voting following the law change. Although 
this shift may occur at the first opportunity, i.e. , 1978, it's reasonable to assume a delay. 
Our analysis assumes a delay of at least one election, implying that it was 1980 before 
an observable shift in absentee voting occurs. This delay assumes that there is a learning 
period before large numbers of voters realize that they too can apply for an absentee 
ballot. Since both the number and percentage of voters utilizing absentee ballots increases 
dramatically after 1980 this shift should be positive. Refer to Table 3 for the percentages 
of absentee voters in California statewide elections since November 1962. The second 
time variable is the overall trend, which we hypothesize to have a positive effect. The 
time since the law change also appears to have a positive effect. 
[Table 3 Here] 
6 Results 
The percent of registered voters chosing to cast absentee ballots is given in Table 3 and 
shown in Figure 3. With the exception of 1978, general elections elicit a higher percentage 
of absentee voters. The rate of absentee voting is relatively "flat" prior to the change 
in legislation, with the predictable midterm lows and presidential highs. After the law 
change, however, the general election absentee rate climbs quickly, still with peaks and 
valleys. The primary election absentee rate begins the time series at a lower rate, meets 
that of general ,elections at. the .time of. the .law change, .. but does not increase as fast after 
that point. The primary election absentee rate also demonstrates the midterm lows and 
presidential highs as seen in the general election. 
for 54.0 percent of the current population, down from 54.8 percent in the early 1960s. 
22The Bay Area and southern California indicators also proxy for the levels of campaign spending 
in California. Although our analysis might benefit from the additional detailed information regarding 
campaign spending, these figures are currently unavailable from the state of California. 
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[Figure 3 Here] 
6.1 Estimation of Affects of Independent Variables 
The estimates for our nested aggregate logit absentee voting model are given in Table 4 
for general elections, and Table 5 for Primary elections. The graphs in Figure 3 show the 
actual versus predicted absentee voting rates for general and primary elections. Although 
the model slightly over-predicts the absentee voting rate, it appears to work very well for 
both general and primary elections.23 
The results related to demographic factors are generally consistent with our expec­
tations. African-Americans vote absentee less often, which may be due to a lack of 
recruiting on the part of the Republican party absentee "drives" in recent years. 24 In­
creasing the percentage of people over the age of 64 increases the percentage of absentee 
voters. This should not be surprising since the over 64 age group was one of th� original 
groups the 1977 legislation was intended to help. The presence of young children also 
increases absentee voting. Again, the legislation change allows parents of such children 
the convenience of voting at home. With potentially a relatively low opportunity cost 
of time, unemployed workers tend to vote absentee less often than their counterparts. 
Consistent with our hypothesis regarding education and Republican party registration, 
education is negatively related to absentee voting in both elections, although the result 
is only statistically significant for general elections. 
One surprising result is related to the income factor in the analysis. Patterson and 
Caldeira report findings that are consistent with the popular press regarding income. 
They indicate that there is a positive relationship between high incomes and absentee 
voting for the three California elections studied. Our empirical analysis of elections 
covering a thirty year period does not support this prediction. In fact, the relationship 
is negative in both types of elections, statistically significant for primaries, and almost 
significant for general elections. Also surprising is the mixed result on urban versus rural 
dwellers. The relationship is not significant for either election type, and is of opposite 
signs. 25 
Although we did not make a prediction regarding homeownership and absentee voting, 
the results indicate a strong negative relationship. This implies that renters vote absentee 
more often than homeowners, ceteris paribus. One possible explanation is that perhaps a 
23The predicted values are based on population weighted means by year for each independent variable. 
In effect, this aeates variables that .reflect· the .-state-wide, demographics. 
24This finding is in contrast with that of Patterson and Caldeira (1985) where they found no difference 
in absentee voting rates for blacks and Hispanics. However, it should be noted that their analysis only 
considered three general elections. 
25Note that this result conflicts with that of Patterson and Caldeira (1985). They find a strong negative 
relationship between urban and absentee voting for 1978, 1980, and 1982. However, they indicate that 
their result should be treated with "healthy skepticism" since California law allows local registrars to 
determine if voters will be provided with a polling location. 
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connection between being "on the road" for work and renting exists. Another possibility 
is that homeowners may feel an increased sense of civic responsibility or obligation such 
that they turnout at precinct polling locations in greater numbers. 
The results on geographic location, Republican party affiliation, and midterm elec­
tions are mixed. As expected, both the San Francisco Bay Area and southern California 
exhibit positive and significant relationships with absentee voting in state-wide general 
elections. Contrary to the popular press and specific election anecdotes, the percentage 
of voters that are registered as Republicans does not appear to impact the absentee vot­
ing rate. Although the percent of Republicans varies from 18 percent to 87 percent, it 
does not appear to affect absentee voting. The impact of midterm elections is as antic­
ipated. Significantly fewer voters cast absentee ballots in midterm elections than do in 
presidential elections. 
[Tables 4 and 5 Here) 
With respect to the inclusive-value factor, the expected maximum utility of not voting 
absentee, our results for the two election types differ. The coefficient of the inclusive-value 
term is of the expected sign and in the unit interval for general elections (p=0.243, t­
stat=4.58) . This supports our hypothesis of a nested model for voter decisions, consistent 
with the process depicted in Figure 2a. As the percentage of precinct voters increases, 
the inclusive-value of not voting absentee increases. This in turn decreases the utility of 
voting absentee, thereby decreasing the fraction of voters casting absentee ballots. Since 
the inclusive-value coefficient lies strictly between zero and one, we conclude that while 
absentee and precinct voting are substitute activities, they are not perfect substitutes. 
This means that a increase in precinct voting decreases both absentee voting and not 
voting, but not in strict proportion. 26 
However, the coefficient of the inclusive-value term in the model of primary elections 
is negative, which is inconsistent with the decision process shown in Figure 2a. 27 An 
26Had the inclusive-value coefficient been estimated to be at either extreme of the unit interval, i.e., 
at zero or one, the implication for the relationship between absentee and precinct voting would have 
been different. If the coefficient of the inclusive-value term had been one, the model in Figure 2a would 
be equivalent to a three-choice non-nested multinomial logit model. In this case, as the percentage 
of precinct voters increases, the percentages of absentees and individuals not voting would decrease 
proportionately. At the other extreme, if the coefficient on the inclusive-value term had been zero then 
the model in Figure 2a would be equivalent to two independent binary logits, one for each decision. In 
this case, an increase in precinct voting would not come at the expense of absentee voting, but would 
instead come entirely from the not-voting population. 
27Note that prior studies of primary voters typically examine the decision to vote in primary elections 
versus general elections. For example, Norrander (1989) finds that there are a few minor ideological 
differences between primary and general voters. Nownes (1992) finds differences in campaign interest 
between primary election voters and general election only voters, but he does not find evidence of a 
differences in social-psychological factors that might motivate voters to participate. Norrander also 
reports (1991) that primary election voters are core voters, implying that primary voters require a lower 
level of stimulus to participate. In contrast, our analysis examines the differences in individual level 
decision processes and the sequence of choices faced by a voter. 
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alternate nesting is depicted in Figure 2b. The first decision for a voter is that of turnout, 
and the second decision, given the decision to vote, is whether to vote absentee or at a 
precinct polling location. Our preliminary results for this model show that it is not 
inconsistent with the voting behavior for primary elections. Interestingly, the Figure 2b 
model is also not supported by the data for general elections. Therefore, it appears that 
voters may be following two different decision models when deciding how to cast a ballot, 
depending on the election type. 28 
An alternate explanation for the sign of the inclusive-value term in the second stage 
model can be found in the theory of substitutes and complements. Recall that the .term as
used in the logit model is log(l -Pk=lli=o), where P k=1Jj=o is the fraction of non-absentee
voters voting at the polling location. By construction the nested logit model displayed 
in Figure 2a allows for a substitute relationship between absentee voting and precinct 
voting as we have discussed above. Inspection of the inclusive-value term with respect to 
changes in the percent voting at the polling location shows this rather directly. As the 
probability of voting at the precinct increases, log(l-P k=llj=o) decreases. Since this term
is multiplied by a positive coefficient in the estimated logit model, a decrease in absentee 
voting is predicted to follow. This too suggests that in general elections absentee and 
precinct voting are substitutes. 
Note that the opposite appears to be true for primary voting. An increase in precinct 
voting in a primary may occur along with an increase in absentee voting. Again, looking 
at the equation we estimated, an increase in the probability of voting at the precinct leads 
to an increase in the probability of voting absentee since the sign of the inclusive-value 
term is negative. 29 
The last set of independent variables we analyze are time related. The first trend 
variable, Trendl, shows that the level of absentee voting in general elections was fairly 
stable, perhaps increasing slightly, through the entire time series. In primary elections 
the Trendl variables shows a significant positive impact on absentee voting rates. The 
intent of the dummy variable was to identify any level shift in absentee voting due to 
the legislation. It appears that given all other changes, the absolute level change was 
negative. However, this is offset by a positive and significant effect from the Trend2 
variable, the time trend after the law change. 
6.2 Impact of Legislation 
The effect of the legislation can be measured by eliminating the dummy variable and the 
second time trend variable, Trend2. Refer to the graphs in Figure 4 for the resulting 
28Note that these results are preliminary. When cell counts are small, as is the case with primary elec­
tions where the absentee vote rate is relatively low, the Berkson-Theil minimum chi-squared estimators 
can have significant small sample bias. 
29It is worth noting that the choice model in Figure 2b is not inconsistent with the hypothesis that 
absentee and precinct voting are complementary activities. 
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changes in predicted levels of absentee voting. The predictions are based on population 
weighted averages of the demographics, with the Dummy79 and Trend2 variables present 
in the "predict" curves, and those two variables set to zero in the "no change" curves. 
In the general election the curve reflecting no legislation is virtually "flat," with a slight 
decline at the end and the typical midterm valleys and presidential peaks. In short, the 
level of absentee voting today would be no different than that in the 1960s and 1970s. We 
performed an F-test for the hypothesis that the impact of the dummy and Trend2 variable 
were not significant. The value of the test was 28.3, which exceeds the critical values of 
3.0. Therefore, we conclude that the legislation was indeed significant in changing the 
level of general election absentee voting. The F-test for the primaries resulted in a value 
of 8.6, exceeding the 95 percent critical value of 3.0, but the absolute predicted difference 
in voting was negligible as shown in Figure 4. 30 
[Figure 4 Here] 
7 Discussion and Conclusion 
The first question is what impact did the change in absentee laws have on voter partici­
pation? Based on our discovery of which choice model, Figure 2a or 2b, more accurately 
reflects the voter's decision process we have a preliminary answer to the question. It 
appears that liberalizing absentee voting policies may have actually increased political 
participation in primaries, beyond what it would have been ceteris paribus, since the 
activities are complements. However, the impact of liberalizing absentee laws on general 
election participation differs since absentee and precinct voting are substitute activities 
in general elections, albeit not perfect substitutes. Thus, the legislative changes of 1977 
may have only slowed the decline in turnout for general elections rather than actually 
increasing the total level of participation. Note that this result is not inconsistent with 
Patterson and Caldeira's findings that "partisan candidates are likely to harvest absentee 
votes in the very localities where their party is otherwise strong (1985, p. 784-785)." The 
fact that we find voters casting absentee in place of voting at the precinct is also consis­
tent with results from Texas (Donovan (1989)). Donovan reports that "advance voting 
has not achieved its prime goal (p. 2895)," with turnout decreasing three percentage 
points, placing Texas near the bottom of the states for turnout. 
The next concern is related to the effect of differences in counties on the. absentee 
voting rate. If we calculate the proportion of the variance in absentee rates that is due to 
county effects, we find that 4.9 percent of the variance in general elections is attributable 
to county effects. In primary elections that percentage falls to 3.8 percent.31 Most of the 
30 Another test related to the change is legislation is whether the rate of increase in absentee voting, 
i.e., the slope of the curve differs in the two periods. This can be tested directly by examining the
Trend2 variable. The resulting F-test for general elections has an F-test value of 41.5, far exceeding the 
95 percent critical value. The primary election results yield an F-test value of 4.4, with a 95 percent 
critical value of 3.85. 
31The value of ( is 0.73077 for general elections and 0.784556 for primary elections. 
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unobserved variation in voting behavior occurs over time. 
What would have happened without the liberalization in absentee voting? Over 
the last four years (1990 through 1994) the general election model predicts an average 
of 13.1 percent absentee voting with the law change, and 5.3 percent without the law 
change. Similarly, the primary model predicts an average of 7.9 percent absentee voting 
with the change, and 7.1 percent without the change. 
To date we have found that the rate of absentee voting is higher now than it would have 
been without the liberalization.32 We have also discovered that voters use different choice 
models in general and primary elections regarding the decision to vote absentee. These 
differences are important when attempting to determine the impact on participation 
that liberalization has had. The different choice models and their implications are also 
important if, as Patterson and Caldeira (1985) suggest, other state will follow California 
in passing permissive absentee laws. 
While these findings are important, there are many open questions about absentee 
voters. Although we now have a better understanding of who votes absentee in which 
elections, we need to study their ballot completion rates and voting patterns. Do they 
indeed vote similar to the precinct counterparts, or are their vote patterns significantly 
different? If they consistently complete less of the ballot, then even though they turnout 
to vote, they are "less" represented in the outcome of the election. Our future research 
will be directed to learning more about voter roll-off, ballot fatigue, strategic voting, and 
voting patterns as they relate to the differences between absentee and precinct voters. We 
will also attempt to answer questions related to which proposition or candidate campaigns 
may benefit or be hurt by an increase in absentee voting. 
32This is consistent with Oliver's (1995) analysis of the absentee voting rates across the fifty states. He 
found that for the 1992 general election voters in states with more liberal absentee laws voted absentee 
more often. 
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VARIABLE 
Demographics 
African-American 
Education 
Income 
Over 64 
Under 6 
Owner 
Unemployment 
Urban 
Geographic Areas 
Bay Area 
Southern California 
Party Affiliation 
Republican 
Elections 
Midterm 
Time 
Dummy79 
Trendl 
Trend2 
Tables 
Table 1: INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
DEFINITION 
% of the population reporting African-American.
Median Years Education for persons over 25 years old. 
Median Family Income for the prior year, in real terms (OOO's) . 
% of the population over 64 years old.
% of the population under 6 years old. 
% of households in owner-occupied housing units.
% of unemployment in the civilian labor force. 
% of population residing in an urban area. 
Alameda, Contra Costa, Marin, Napa, San Francisco, San 
Mateo, Santa Clara, Santa Cruz, Solano and Sonoma counties. 
Imperial, Los Angeles, Orange, Riverside, San Diego, 
Santa Barbara, and Ventura counties. 
% of registered voters that are Republican.
Election year was 1962, 1966, 1970, 1974, 1978, 1982, 1986, 
1990, or 1994. 
Dummy indicating if election occurred after 1979, 0 otherwise. 
Election year minus 1961. 
'Election year rninus 1961 if the year is after 1979, 0 otherwise. 
squared. 
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Table 2: MEAN VALUES OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
VARIABLE 1960 1970 1980 1990 
Demographics 
African-American 2.46 2.86 3.07 3.40 
(2. 78) (3.33) (3.79) (3.64) 
Education 11.27 12.19 12.68 12.19 
(0.87) (0.41) (0.35) (0.63) 
Income 20.16 24.28 19.88 27.12 
(2.67) (3.77) (3.44) (6.35) 
Over 64 9.60 10.44 11.58 12.91 
(3.18) (3.27) (2.95) (3.83) 
Under 6 10.75 7.72 7.29 9.16 
(1.52) (1.12) (1.20) (1.45) 
Owner 61.58 60.97 62.91 61.93 
(6.87) (6.31) (7.46) (7.63) 
Unemployment 7.17 7.71 9.33 7.72
(2.30) (1.12) (3.32) (2.37) 
Urban 49.49 56.40 59.79 65.15 
(29.07) (31.11) (31.12) (28. 78) 
Party Affiliation - Republican Registration 
Primary Electionst 39.40 40.49 35.21 39.50 
(5.67) (5.38) ( 4.48) (6.43) 
General Electionst 39.56 39.94 35.53 39.62 
(8.57) (5.42) ( 4.63) (6.51) 
Percent Precinct Voting 
Primary Electionst 73.84 67.78 64.88 47.41 
(3.21) (6.43) ( 4.44) (9.98) 
General Electionst 79.25 76.86 77.34 58.77 
(2.36) (3.03) (3.43) (6.99) 
t The electoral data in the 1960 column is from 1962 for general 
elections, and 1964 for primary elections rather than 1960. 
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Table 3: ACTUAL ABSENTEE PERCENTAGES t 
CALIFORNIA 
STATEWIDE ELECTIONS 
YEAR PRIMARY GENERAL 
1962 n/a:t 2.07 
1964 1.53 3.72 
1966 1.22 2.62 
1968 1.82 3.89 
1970 1.25 2.34 
1972 2.24 3.87 
1974 1.68 2.23 
1976 3.54 3.67 
1978 3.28 3.10 
1980 3.21 4.83 
1982 2.94 4.54 
1984 3.63 6.99 
1986 3.49 5.34 
1988 4.56 10.24 
1990 6.23 10.77 
1992 7.95 12.92 
1994 7.13 13.33 
t The absentee rate in this table 
is the percent of registered voters 
casting absentee ballots. 
+ The 1962 primary election data 
was not available. 
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Table 4: GENERAL ELECTION RESULTS 
ESTIMATED 
VARIABLE COEFFICIENT T-STATISTIC 
Constant -0.965 ** -2.10 .
Demographics 
African-American -0.031 *** -7.09 
Education -0.100 *** -3.56 
Income -0.007 -1.50 
Over 64 0.050 *** 5.48 
Under 6 0.028 1.43 
Owner -0.009 *** -2.79 
Unemployment -0.042 *** -4.82 
Urban -0.002 -1.05 
Geographic Areas 
Bay Area 0.188 *** 2.58 
Southern California 0.095 ** 2.07 
Party Affiliation 
Republican 0.154 0.63 
Elections 
Midterm -0.346 *** -13.41 
Time 
Dummy79 -1.225 *** -5.66 
Trendl 0.007 1.34 
Trend2 0.072 *** 6.44 
Inclusive Value/Not Absentee 0.243 *** 4.58 
Number of 'Observations 969 
Corrected R-Squared 0. 70171
Notes: *p=.10, **p=.05, ***p=.01 
The dependent variable is the log odds of voting absentee. 
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Table 5: PRIMARY ELECTION RESULTS 
ESTIMATED 
VARIABLE COEFFICIENT T-STATISTIC 
Constant 
Demographics 
African-American 
Education 
Income 
Over 64 
Under 6 
Owner · 
Unemployment 
Urban 
Geographic Areas 
Bay Area 
Southern California 
Party Affiliation 
Republican 
· Elections
Midterm
Time
Dummy79
Trendl
Trend2
Inclusive Value/Not Absentee
Number of Observations 
Corrected R-Squared 
Notes: *p=.10, **p=.05, ***p=.01 
-4.370 ***  
-0.023 *** 
-0.031 
-0.011 **  
0.054 *** 
0.046 ** 
-0.009 ***  
-0.041 *** 
0.001 
0.142 * 
0.137 ***  
0.114 
-0. 060 *** 
-0.583 *** 
0.063 ***
0.023 ** 
-0.637 *** 
907 
0.63834 
The dependent variable is the log odds of voting absentee. 
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-8.95 
-4.88 
-1.10 
-2.52 
5.79 
2.32 
-2.68 
-4.62 
0.66 
1.83 
2.84 
0.46 
-3.63 
-2.78 
12.18 
2.10 
-9.96 
0 . 2 0 
0 . 1 0 
0 . 0 0 
Figure 1: Absentees as Percent of Ballots Cast 
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Figure 2a: Absentee Voting Model 
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Figure 2b: Alternate Absentee Voting Model 
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Figure 3: Actual Versus Predicted Absentee Voting as Percent of Registered Voters 
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Figure 4: Predicted Absentee Voting With and Without Legislation 
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